Introduction 

The year 2025 was one marked by conflict for Cambodia. Civilians and soldiers were killed, injured, and hundreds of thousands in the bordering provinces with Thailand were displaced multiple times by fighting between the two countries, initially in July and then for a sustained period in December. Regrettably, fundamental freedoms continued to be subject to restriction in 2025, with the border conflict exposing the extent to which the country’s independent media sector had been eroded and the continued restrictions placed on exercising freedom of expression. 

Fighting between Cambodia and Thailand first began on 24 July and lasted until 28 July, when a ceasefire was brokered by Malaysia and the United States. Tensions had been building along the border for some months, with both sides exchanging gunfire on 28 May, resulting in one Cambodian soldier being killed. The fighting in July began after Thai soldiers were injured by a landmine explosion, which Thailand claimed had been laid by Cambodia, a claim denied by the Cambodian military. Both sides maintain that the other started the fighting. Official sources indicate that displacement figures in Cambodia reached more than 170,000 by early August across Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear, Banteay Meanchey, Pursat and Siem Reap. On 29 August, despite the agreement of the ceasefire the previous day, 20 Cambodian soldiers were captured by the Thai military. Whilst two were released on 1 August, the remaining 18 were ultimately held captive for 155 days before finally being released on 31 December. From August to November, skirmishes and clashes continued. This occurred particularly in border towns and villages in Banteay Meanchey, where the Thai military had erected barbed wire barricades, installed signs instructing villagers to leave their homes, and fired tear gas, rubber bullets, and used a Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) against Cambodian villagers who attempted to prevent the installation of the barricades. Such incidents continued at intervals until 8 December, when fighting between the two military forces resumed, lasting until a ceasefire was agreed on 27 December. In the weeks of fighting in December, it’s estimated that more than 500,000 Cambodians were displaced from their homes and land – many of whom had already been displaced by the fighting in July. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) recorded that 32 Cambodian civilians were killed and 93 were injured in the weeks of fighting in December. As the year drew to an end, the ceasefire remained in force; however, thousands of those displaced remained in temporary camps, waiting to see how the situation would develop before returning to their homes. 

The UN Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, Prof. Vitit Muntarbhorn, presented his annual report to the UN Human Rights Council in October. The thematic focus of the report was on natural resources and human rights, and also covered human rights developments in the country for the period June 2024 to June 2025. Before delving into the thematic focus of the report, the UNSR analyzes several topical human rights issues, including the targeting of civil society organizations and trade unions, stating that many of their members were “hounded by the authorities throughout the reporting period”, as well as transnational repression of political activists in exile. On the landscape for media freedom, the UNSR lamented that the 2024 Charter for Professional Journalism and its coverage of social media contributed to “accelerating the whirlpool of censorship and self-censorship”. The UNSR reported that the new administration, led by the son of the former Prime Minister and current Senate President, has overseen “the perpetuation of a system in which power remains in the hand of the established elite”, that “the current rulers are closely aligned with the political party that won the largest shares of votes… in various rigged elections”, and that there is “a top-down antagonism towards a plural democratic system and the full range of human rights reflected in the Paris Peace Agreement”. Poignantly, the UNSR adds that “a timely reminder for self-reflection is the year 2025 itself, which marks the fiftieth anniversary of the ascent of the Khmer Rouge to power”. 

The report then focuses on natural resources, stating that “the ongoing challenge is to advocate for more inclusion and conservation and less for exclusion and exploitation”. Whilst the land-related recommendations of the report are elaborated on below under “Land Rights”, it is worth noting that the UNSR’s report draws heavily on CCHR’s analysis of the issues facing community fisheries (CFIs). It notes, “the increase in development projects and tourism sites in recent years, particularly in marine and coastal areas, poses a significant threat to the survival of community fisheries”. 

The year also saw increased national and international scrutiny on the issue of cyber scam operations being conducted through “scam centers” in Cambodia, relying on the trafficked labour of hundreds, if not thousands, of people from across Asia and beyond. A +240 page report by Amnesty International on the topic, released in June, found that “human trafficking, forced labour, child labour, torture and ill-treatment, deprivation of liberty and/or other human rights abuses [was being] carried out primarily by organized criminal actors”. The report documented 53 scamming compounds and 45 suspicious locations, which may also be compounds or linked to them. Amnesty described the illicit industry as a “sprawling, violent criminal operation that is taking place often with the full knowledge of the Cambodian authorities, whose woefully ineffective – and at times corrupt – response to the scamming crisis demonstrates its acquiescence and points towards state complicity in the human rights abuses taking place”. Since early 2025 and in response to increased pressure, the RGC has made hundreds of arrests as part of a “crackdown” on scam centers, though reports suggest that victims have been overwhelmingly targeted in arrests, not those behind the operations. 

• I. Political Environment 

For yet another year, the political opposition continued to be targeted, primarily through legal harassment. However, the assassination of a former member of parliament and member of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), Lim Kimya, whilst on holiday in Thailand, constituted a concerning escalation not only in repression of the political opposition, but also transnational repression, increasingly opted for by the ruling party. 

On 7 January, Lim Kinya, travelling with his wife, had just stepped off a bus in Bangkok after travelling from Cambodia, when he was shot twice in the chest. A French and Cambodian national, Lim Kimya, was known to be active on social media for his criticism of the RGC, with his last Facebook post made on 3 January, prior to his killing. A Thai suspect was arrested the following day in Battambang and extradited to Thailand and charged with premeditated murder, carrying a firearm in public without a valid reason, and discharging a firearm in a public area. Later the same month, the Thai authorities issued arrest warrants for two Cambodian nationals, with one alleged to have hired the gunman and another to have acted as a spotter, travelling on the same bus as Lim Kimya. The individual accused of hiring the gunman previously worked as an adviser to the former Prime Minister and current Senate President, according to media reports, prompting the ruling party to issue a statement, saying that he had been dismissed from the role in March 2024. The political opposition also alleged the involvement of a high-ranking government official close to the former Prime Minister and current Senate President, pointing to leaked audio of a conversation between the two about the need to target members of the opposition in exile in Thailand. The government official in question denied this allegation. On 3 September, the Thai gunman was convicted by a court in Bangkok and sentenced to life imprisonment. By the year’s end, the two Cambodian suspects remained at large, with Interpol Red Notices also issued against them. 

In 2025, two longstanding legal cases against Rong Chhun, senior adviser to the Nation Power Party, former vice-president of the Candlelight Party, and labour rights activist, came to significant junctures.  In April, the Phnom Penh Municipal Court ordered the seizure of his assets, including his home. The order was made in connection with a $100,000 USD fine linked to an incitement conviction in 2021. Since then, the payment deadline for the fine has been appealed and extended numerous times. Rong Chhun had requested to pay in installments after missing a deadline in February, but after failing to meet an extension in March, the court ordered the forced seizure and sale of his home. 

In May, the Phnom Penh Municipal Court convicted Rong Chhun of “incitement”. This “incitement” charge was brought against him in July 2024, in response to a video of him in which he accused the RGC of “disregarding human rights and democratic principles”, as well as an interview he gave to the Radio Free Asia (“RFA”) in which he argued that there were irregularities in the demarcation of border posts with Vietnam. He was sentenced to four years in prison and fined 4 million riel (approximately 1,000 USD). In addition, and representing a concerning increase in the severity of punishment usually issued against members of the opposition, Rong Chhun was permanently barred from voting or running for office. 

• II. Legislative Developments 

The most notable and concerning legislative development in 2025 was the RGC’s amendment of the Nationality Law in September, which enabled it to arbitrarily strip Cambodian’s of their citizenship. The amendments to Article 29 of the Law now allow for the revocation of citizenship if they are found to have committed “treason” or conspired “with foreigners causing harm to the core interests of the Kingdom of Cambodia”; “acts which cause harm to national sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security”; and if they have been “convicted of a felony or misdemeanour related to the abuse of the King, affecting the security of the State, or acts of terrorism”. The broad and vague nature of these provisions prompted significant concern about how they would be applied - particularly considering that the charges of “lese majeste” and “treason” have been increasingly brought against human rights defenders, journalists, and activists in recent years. The amendments came about in response to calls from the Senate President and were made possible by the passing of a Constitutional Amendment on 15 July. 

Towards the end of the year, media reporting indicated that the RGC may be taking steps towards the implementation of the controversial Sub-decree on the National Internet Gateway (NIG). As it mandates that all internet traffic circulating within and coming into Cambodia be channelled through a single gateway, its passage in 2020 prompted fears that the RGC would thereby have the means to monitor internet activity, intercept and censor digital communications, and enable the collection, retention and sharing of personal data. Despite the fact that the NIG was due to be enforced from 16 February 2022, its planned implementation was delayed a number of times by the RGC – citing COVID-19 and infrastructure challenges, among others. In October 2025, however, it was reported that a document from the Ministry of Planning titled “Install and Manage National Internet Gateways”, dated May of the same year, included details about the RGC’s plans to start work on the NIG infrastructure in 2026. The document reportedly states that “Through the use of big data, artificial intelligence technology, the Royal Government can analyze and manage social media broadcasts”. By the year’s end, this information had not yet been published by the RGC. Should the stated plans be true, it represents a concerning step in the implementation of the NIG. 

• III. Freedom of Expression 

Exercising the right to freedom of expression continues to entail significant risks for those expressing dissenting opinions – whether they are social media users, human rights defenders, or journalists reporting on public-interest issues. 

• Silencing of free media and harassment of journalists 

Media freedom was further undercut for yet another year in a row. The situation was not helped by the fact that independent radio stations Radio Free Asia  (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA) had their funding cut unexpectedly by the US Government, constituting a significant blow to the country’s dwindling media freedom, with effectively only one completely independent media outlet now remaining. 

Legal harassment continued to be a favored tool by the RGC and powerful individuals in attempts to threaten and silence journalists who reported on their policies and actions, in the public interest. Among the most vulnerable to such harassment and other forms of intimidation were journalists covering the exploitation of natural resources and the impact of large development projects on communities and the environment. An emblematic case of such was the arrest and indictment of journalist Uk Mao in Stung Treng province in May. Since June 2024, Uk Mao had been subjected to intimidation, violence, and threats in connection with his reporting on illegal logging and uncovering links between the companies carrying it out and the Cambodian military. He was perversely charged with illegally clearing state-owned forest and incitement and placed under judicial supervision indefinitely. In March 2025, he was physically assaulted by three individuals – reportedly former officials – whilst returning from reporting on illegal logging. When officers then a arrived at his home in April, no warrant was produced, and he was subsequently charged with “incitement to commit a felony” and “public defamation” and placed in pre-trial detention. Uk Mao was eventually granted bail, but still faced at least 15 legal complaints against him. As further proof of the acute risk faced by journalists reporting on natural resource exploitation, due to the matrix of powerful actors usually involved, two journalists were shot at whilst returning from covering illegal logging in Stung Treng. On 5 June, Thlang Tao and Hang Chenda from the online news outlet Norkor Achhariyak were shot at by individuals hiding on the roadside. Fortunately, the two journalists escaped unharmed, and two suspects were arrested the following day. 

In many ways, the experiences of journalists covering the border conflict revealed the dismal state of media freedom in the country, as a result of years of targeted attacks, closures, and the creation of a constraining environment. Journalists were detained, accused of being spies, threatened with arrest, and had media licenses revoked. In one case, two journalists for the media outlet TSP 68 TV Online – Porn Sopheap and Pheap Pheara – were arrested and charged with “treason” under Article 445 of the Criminal Code, “supplying a foreign state with information prejudicial to national defence”, a charge which carries potential imprisonment of 7-15 years. The charges were seemingly in relation to posts on Facebook regarding the conflict, though it remains unclear which posts or information exactly. The two had appeared in a photograph with several Cambodian soldiers in front of Ta Krabei Temple, which was widely used by Thai media outlets, alleging that unplaced landmines were visible in the background and that it had been taken after the ceasefire on 28 July. 

In the context of the conflict, the Ministry of Information (“MoI”) issued a mandatory media protocol on 1 August, for “journalists, content creators, and the general public concerning the coverage, publication, and sharing of information related to border issues and military strongholds”. Its stated intent is to “safeguard national security, ensure the safety of media personnel, promote a unified voice between the government and the public, and guarantee the dissemination of accurate and verified information”. As per the guidelines, individuals involved in media or content creation must notify and obtain permission from the MoI and relevant authorities before approaching military strongholds for reporting or filming purposes. 

Following on from the 2024 Charter for Professional Journalism, in what appear to be apparent attempts to restrict the media environment through imposing professional requirements and standards, the Ministry of Information issued Prakas No. 294 in December, titled “Qualifications and Journalistic Professionalism”. With little to no consultation with independent media outlets or organizations working on media freedom, the Prakas was issued with the stated aim of strengthening the media, promoting professionalism and improving the quality and safety of information. The contents of the Prakas, however, create onerous and arbitrary requirements for both outlets and journalists, rather than strengthening or improving the media landscape. It introduces a licensing and qualification system, requiring a number of approvals from the Ministry of Information, and mandates letters of “good conduct” from local authorities. The Prakas was issued in conjunction with new rules for Press Cards for 2026, which require journalists to confirm that they are not facing any legal complaints or court cases. This creates a significant challenge for many journalists, given that they are frequently subjected to legal harassment on charges such as “incitement”, “defamation” and “public insult” for reporting on public interest issues. These two new policy developments serve to further constrict the media environment for the country’s dwindling independent media. 

• Online expression 

Expressing oneself online continued to entail significant risk, whether for activists or ordinary citizens. This was particularly evident in the context of the border conflict, with at least 16 individuals – including members of the National Power Party and the Move Forward Party, a bank employee and a tour guide, amongst others – being charged with “incitement” to commit a felony or disturb social security (Articles 494 & 495) or “insult” (Article 502) under the Criminal Code. At least three individuals were charged with “treason”, which carries potential sentences ranging from 5-15 years. The individuals in question had expressed their personal views on social media about the conflict and its impacts, with at least four being convicted by the end of the year. Activist Phon Yuth, who has a physical disability and uses a wheelchair, was arrested at his home in Takeo in October. He was charged with “incitement” in relation to his Facebook posts in which he criticized the RGC’s handling of the conflict. This was the third time that Phon Yuth has been arrested for his Facebook posts – once in 2019 and a second time in 2024. A social media influencer known as Love Riya was arrested in August for her comments online, stating that she would continue to buy legally available Thai products, despite calls for boycotting goods from the country. She was charged with “incitement” and also “demoralizing the military”, article 472 of the Criminal Code, and potentially faces 2-5 years imprisonment, if convicted. 

There was a significant amount of disinformation and misinformation being shared online during the border conflict. This appeared to occur in the vacuum of prompt, reliable information being shared by the RGC, to both the public and the media. This level of disinformation is also an indicator of the current situation regarding media freedom, as disinformation and misinformation proliferated on social media in the absence of a robust, independent media sector. 

• IV. Freedom of Association

The right to freedom of association continued to be subjected to stringent restrictions and retaliation, both for those exercising it and those merely discussing or reporting on the difficulties in exercising it in Cambodia.

Labour union leaders continued to be targeted with arbitrary arrest and indictment for carrying out their duties in representing workers. On 16 July, the Phnom Penh Appeal Court upheld the conviction of Chea Chantha, local leader of the Independent Democratic Association of Informal Economy (IDEA). Chantha was sentenced to 18 months by the Svay Rieng Provincial Court in December 2024 for the charge of fraud for disseminating information on the registration of NSSF cards to informal vendors. His appeal hearing took place seven months after his conviction, during which time he remained in pre-trial detention, despite his worsening health condition. 

On 19 September, Pich Piseth, an employee at Men Ou garment factory and president of its workers' union, was arrested on incitement charges after commenting on a social media post criticizing Sok Kin, president of the Building and Wood Workers Trade Union Federation of Cambodia (BWTUC) and chair of the Cambodian Labor Confederation (CLC).   

On 8 November, labor rights defender Morm Rithy was released from Prey Sar prison after serving an 18-month sentence for “incitement” and “discrediting a judicial decision” under Articles 494, 495, and 523 of the Cambodian Criminal Code. The charges were brought against him in relation to a Facebook post in which he criticized a casino owner in relation to a dispute regarding a female casino worker, which he called unjust. Rithy, president of the Cambodian Tourism and Service Workers’ Federation (CTSWF) and vice president of the CLC suffered serious health problems during his imprisonment due to conditions in prison. Rithy appealed for his conviction to be overturned, but on 23 December 2025, the Supreme Court upheld his conviction. 

• V. Freedom of Assembly 

Exercising the right to freedom of assembly continued to be met with almost systematic restrictions or actions by the authorities to prevent it from being exercised altogether, as demonstrated by the restrictions on the use of Freedom Park throughout 2025, continuing a trend evident in recent years. 

On 23 April 2025, the Nation Power Party (NPP), planning to mark International Labor Day on 1 May, was informed by Phnom Penh Municipal Authorities that Freedom Park was not a place for celebrations and, therefore, could not be used. Two days later, the authorities used the same reason in response to a notification letter submitted by a group of CSOs, stating their intent to use Freedom Park to mark International Labor Day. The CSOs clarified that they wished to hold a public peaceful gathering, to which the authorities responded that the notification process hadn’t been adequately followed and that the CSOs should hold the event at their offices.  

Following the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict in late July, CCHR documented that the authorities cited the border conflict as a reason for not being able to peacefully assemble at Freedom Park. However, in August of this year, there were mass turnouts in Phnom Penh for marches calling for an end to the conflict. This was again observed on 18 December, when over 30,000 people attended the “March for Peace” as fighting between Cambodia and Thailand resumed on 7 December. This begs the question as to which forms of assembly and for what causes are permitted to occur, while others are denied from taking place. 

Additionally, on 16 July, nine former Boeung Tamok villagers were sentenced to one month in prison for protesting a land acquisition and charged with “opposing public office” despite agreeing to accept the government’s land exchange plan in August 2024. However, the court was unclear as to whether they needed to serve their sentence or if the sentences were suspended. 

• VI. Social and Economic Rights 

• Land rights

With the restricted space of independent media and journalism, the monitoring of land rights abuses has become increasingly challenging in Cambodia. However, CCHR continues to closely monitor incidents of land grabbing and land dispute cases. The Cambodia-Thailand border conflict displaced hundreds of thousands of people living along the border, with many fearing land grabs in this context. 

On 28 January, a worker from a private company attacked an indigenous villager with a sword while some 200 villagers blocked tractors during a tense standoff over disputed farmland in Preah Vihear. The clash between the Kuy indigenous people, provincial authorities, and workers from Santana Agro Products Co. Ltd. began when villagers held a religious ceremony to curse and condemn the agricultural development and processing company. Kuy indigenous villagers alleged that corrupt officials and businessmen are working together to clear approximately 1,050 hectares of ancestral forest. In a press conference held by the Kuy indigenous people on 3 March, they stated that the individuals carrying out the land clearing are linked to the province's deputy governor, Ouk Kimsan, who allegedly owns the company Santana Agro Product Co Ltd. They called on the authorities to intervene to prevent the clearing of their land.  

As a result of the first period of fighting in the border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand in July, hundreds of thousands of people were displaced across the five provinces of Oddar Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey, Preah Vihear, Pursat, and Siem Reap. According to figures released by the Ministry of Defense, as of 31 July, approximately 172,094 people had been displaced. The provinces most affected by the conflict are also some of the provinces where disputes over land and access to natural resources have been most prevalent. They are also home to indigenous communities, a group particularly affected by land disputes. CCHR received information from a number of individuals, including Indigenous Peoples, who were ordered to leave their respective homes in the provinces of Preah Vihear, Pursat, and Oddar Meanchey. Many of the people who spoke to CCHR shared similar fears around losing their land and homes to “opportunists” or “powerful” figures who take advantage of the situation and seize their land and occupy their homes, leaving them landless. 

The UNSR in Cambodia’s annual report provided significant coverage of the issue of land rights. He noted that there were “interconnected challenges”, including forced evictions, land tenure and dispossession, respect for the principle of free, prior and informed consent, predatory microfinance and debt, and reprisals against stakeholders. The report highlights that a lack of transparency, corruption issues, and failure to implement environmental impact assessments have created a situation whereby “here have been large numbers of forced displacements of people, dispossessions of their land, cases of landlessness, problematic resettlements and related injustices in recent years, with hundreds of thousands of people estimated to be affected. These are coupled with a reported concentration of land ownership among tycoons and their political friends, extensive deforestation, illegal logging and mining, hydro projects with negative impacts on humans and the environment, overlap with protected areas, and other examples of exploitation of natural resources”. 

• Worker’s rights 

Throughout September, a broad range of trade unions and civil society organizations, including CCHR, came together to advocate for an increase in the living wage for garment, footwear, and travel goods (GFT) workers. Cambodia’s GFT sector employs nearly one million people, predominantly women, and therefore makes up the majority of the country’s formal workforce. In 2025, GFT workers earned a minimum wage of $208, despite the fact that workers spend an average of $408 per month, which mean many must resort to loans in order to subsidise their wages, driving a significant number into debt. In this context, the civil society campaign advocated the RGC for a 2026 minimum wage of US$232 a month. However, on 17 September, the Prime Minister announced on Facebook that the 2026 minimum wage would increase by just US$2, bringing it to US$210 - far short of the US$232 requested by the civil society campaign. 

The conflict between Cambodia and Thailand forced over 900,000 migrant workers in Thailand to return home to Cambodia, citing an unsafe environment. This has left many in a position of struggling to pay back their debt from microfinance loans due to the loss of wages and limited support by the RGC in their integration back to Cambodia. In an impact assessment study by Centre for Alliance of Labour and Human Rights (CENTRAL) of 527 returnee migrants, a total of 65 percent of returnees had no savings remaining from work in Thailand. Furthermore, 71 percent reported having debt, with most owing to one or two creditors, with an average debt amount of $5,500. Despite government pledges of jobs and aid, Human Rights Watch found that “very few jobs” were available, claiming that the Cambodian government has “long failed” to ensure an adequate standard of living for migrant workers.                       

December 2025 also marked four years since the NagaWorld employees began their strike, becoming the longest worker strike in Cambodian history. On 21 February, approximately 40 Labor Rights Support Union of Khmer Employees of NagaWorld (LRSU) members gathered in front of the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training to follow up on a complaint filed in January. In late October, the LRSU renewed its calls for a resolution, submitting letters to the Ministry of Labor and eight embassies, seeking their intervention based on the 2023 recommendations of the International Labor Organization (ILO). However, they have yet to receive a clear response from the ministry. 

• VII. The Justice System 

• Weaponization of the judicial system 

The judicial system continued to be misused to attempt to silence and discourage human rights defenders, journalists and ordinary citizens who advocated for human rights, democracy, better governance and political pluralism. As expressed by the UN Special Rapporteur in his report, “judicialized lawfare casts a wide shadow over those perceived to be dissidents, with the justice system being used to apply laws and policies to sanction decisions from the top”. 

The trial of those who were arrested in July – November 2024, for expressing their opinions about the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV-DTA), finally commenced, but not until August 2025. The trial includes Paris Peace Agreement (PPA) activists Srun Srorn, Pheung Sophea and San Sith, who were the first to be arrested in July 2024, and are charged with “incitement to disturb social security” under Articles 494 and 495 of the Criminal Code. The case – involving 37 defendants – had been split into five smaller cases in December 2024, a decision upheld by the Phnom Penh Appeal Court in February. According to Cambodian law, the judge of the Court of First Instance had four months (March – June) following the decision of the Appeal Court to start the trial. However, the trial did not open before the Phnom Penh Municipal Court until 27 August. In an unprecedented move, the Court also adopted a rotation-like system for adjudicating the five cases of 37 defendants, whereby it opened the first case and would then spend the next four weeks opening each of the remaining four cases, before returning to the first case, and so on. It is unclear as to why this approach was opted for, as it would seemingly run counter to the decision to divide the case into five smaller cases. From January to December, the three PPA activists were denied bail five times, meaning they had spent more than 500 days in pre-trial detention by the end of 2025. 

The five Mother Nature activists, currently imprisoned since their 2024 conviction for “plotting” and “lese majeste” were denied bail on three occasions throughout 2025. First, the Phnom Penh Appeal Court denied their request in February, a decision that was upheld by the Supreme Court in April. In December, a new bail request was once again denied by the Phnom Penh Appeal Court. They are serving sentences ranging from 6-8 years for their work documenting and advocating against environmental harm, and remain in prison whilst awaiting their long-delayed appeal trial. December marked 1.5 years since they had been convicted, and thus a significant delay in their case. The month also brought a grim milestone for human rights defender Koet Saray, who  marked more than 600 days in prison. As the year ended, he was still awaiting his appeal trial, since being convicted in November 2024. 

• VIII. Women's Rights and Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer (“LGBTIQ”) rights 

• LGBTIQ rights 

As noted in the 2024 Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the RGC accepted all 12 recommendations made on LGBTIQ rights and sexual orientation, gender identity and expression and sex characteristics. The recommendations broadly cover three main areas: to continue progress towards recognizing legal marriage equality for same-sex couples; to enable legal gender recognition of self-defined gender identity for transgender and gender-diverse persons; and to continue progress towards full equality for LGBT+ persons and adopt effective measures protecting from discrimination based on SOGIESC. However, we have observed that the RGC has made no progress on the above recommendations. While societal perspectives have shifted, whereby acceptance is growing, and there is an increase in visibility for LGBTIQ people, the lack of legal protections leaves LGBTIQ people vulnerable to discrimination.  

• Women’s rights 

According to the petition submitted by CSOs, trade union federations and associations within the 16 Days Campaign 2025, under the theme “protecting citizens’ well-being for social justice in the digital age” they presented 16 priority needs for the RGC to address to accelerate women’s rights in Cambodia. Of the 16 demands, the organizations highlighted the need to address gender-based violence, harassment, discrimination, intimidation, and labor exploitation – especially for women in the garment supply chain – and violence against women and girls, particularly lesbians, women and girls with disabilities, indigenous women and girls, women activists representing CSOs, unions, land activists, political parties, and environmentalists, as they continue to occur in all forms and places, including private, public and online spaces. 

Moreover, in his report for 2025, the UNSR reflected on the extensive gender gap in the political and electoral field in Cambodia, showing that women are disadvantaged and that more proactive measures need to be implemented to address this gap. Currently, only 13.6 per cent of women are members of the National Assembly – this is a slight decline from 21.1 per cent in 2018. The UNSR also highlights the importance of involving women in natural disaster management as one of the most disaster-prone countries in South-East Asia.  

Amidst the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict, the reported rape of an 18-year-old migrant woman worker returning from Thailand highlighted the acute risks faced by women and girls in conflict zones. The case also prompted necessary reflection and conversation on how to ensure safer migration pathways for women migrant workers.  

Conclusion 

The year 2025 both brought and exposed further human rights challenges for Cambodia, namely in relation to the border conflict and the issue of cyber scam compounds, which reached a pressure point. Both national and international pressure regarding the cyber scam compounds and the myriad human rights issues implicated – slavery, human trafficking, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, torture, and the deprivation of liberty - forcing a response from the RGC, though the adequacy of this response remains to be seen. The conflict with Thailand not only caused significant displacement and the return of hundreds of thousands of migrant workers in search of new employment, but also the RGC’s responses to those who expressed their opinions online about the conflict, and the restrictions faced by journalists covering it, provided further proof of the enduring curtailment of civic space and exercising fundamental freedoms.